Constitutional Municipal Home rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model by Vanlandingham, Kenneth
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 2
Constitutional Municipal Home rule Since the
AMA (NLC) Model
Kenneth Vanlandingham
Copyright c 1975 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1 (1975), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss1/2
William and Mary Law Review
VOLUME 17 FALL 1975 NUMBER 1
AR TICL ES
CONSTITUTIONAL MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
SINCE THE AMA (NLC) MODELt
KENNETH VANLANDINGHAM*
Throughout its formative period, municipal home rule in the United
States was defined primarily by the imperium in inpe2io doctrine.' That
construct allows municipal autonomy within a limited sphere, such as
t This article is based in part on information obtained from questionnaires sent during
the years 1970 and 1971 to directors of state municipal leagues, state departments of
community affairs, state legislative reference bureaus, and university professors of law
and political science, and on correspondence since then with several of these officials.
The author wishes to thank all those who cooperated by supplying information, both
published and unpublished. Responsibility for all conclusions drawn, and for all errors,
is his own.
* A.B., M.A., University of Kentucky; Ph.D., University of Illinois. Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
1. The imperium in imperio doctrine originated in the development of constitutional
home rule in Missouri. By the provisions of that state's constitution, cities were author-
ized to frame charters for their own government "consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of the State." Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875). This requirement
was eventually interpreted to mean "that only in matters involving statewide concern
did charter provisions have to be consistent with and subject to the constitution and
laws." Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 269, 284 (1968). See also Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of
the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 51-57 (1968). The term "hmperium in
imperio" was used by Justice Brewer to describe this form of judicially defined municipal
autonomy in St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). For a
general discussion of the development of the imperio doctrine, see Vanlandingham
supra.
There is no unanimity among authorities as to the proper meaning of municipal home
rule, but historically there is inherent in the concept the idea of some degree of local
power free from state legislative and administrative control. At least one author has
suggested that home rule implies a federal relationship between the state and its munici-
palities. See H. McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MuNIcPAL HOME RULE, ch. 4
(1916). Those attempted judicial definitions of home rule suggest that it pertains solely
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"municipal affairs," 2 the boundaries of which are left to judicial deter-
mination.3 Believing the imperio model4 to be unsatisfactory as an exces-
sively narrow and uncertain avenue for municipal exercise of home rule
powers, 5 the American Municipal Association (AMA), subsequently re-
to local self-government or to the internal affairs of a municipality. See, e.g., Attorney
Gen. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 642-43, 92 N.W. 289, 290 (1902); Common-
wealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 152, 193 A. 628, 630-31 (1937); People
ex rel. Metropolitan St. Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 431-32, 67 N.E.
69, 70-71 (1903); People ex rel. Miller v. Johnson, 34 Colo. 143, 159, 86 P. 233, 238
(1905); Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, -, 58 P. 923, 925 (1899); Plantation Pipe Line
Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 16-17, 178 S.E.2d 868, 879 (1970) (Hawes, J., dissent-
ing). Constitutional provisions stating the purpose or meaning of home rule, reinforce
the judicial limitation. See, e.g., ALAS. CONsT. art. X, § 1 ("maximum local self-gov-
ernment"); COLO. CONsT. art. XX, § 6 ("the full right of self-government in both local
and municipal matters"); MAss. CONST. art. of amend. II ("the right of self-government
in local matters"); N.M. CONT. art. X, § 6E ("maximum local self-government");
R.I. CoNsr. amend. XXVIII, § 1 ("the right of self government in all local matters").
The Florida constitutional provision is particularly illustrative of the restrictive ap-
proach to municipal home rule. It provides that: "Municipalities shall have governmen-
tal, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power
for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." FLA. CONsT. art. VIII,
§ 2(b).
Throughout the entire period of constitutional home rule, and particularly during
the past 40 years, most provisions adopted have placed home rule, especially substantive
home rule, almost completely subject to state legislative control. Inasmuch as these
provisions make home rule a matter of state legislative grace, not a constitutional right,
proponents of imperio home rule usually consider them unsatisfactory, and the char-
acter of home rule existing under them seems inconsistent with judicial and constitu-
tional definitions.
Home rule does not release a city from its responsibilities and obligations imposed
by proper state laws. Many municipal officials believe that it empowers them to do
almost anything they choose free from state legislative restraint. They resent state
legislative interference in what they consider municipal treasuries. See generally Brown,
Home Rule in Massacbusetts: Municipal Freedom and Llegislative Control, 58 MAss.
L.Q. 29, 29-31, 37-39 (1973).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (a).
3. Responsibility for determination of what constitutes a municipal affair or function
rests with the state courts. See State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, 231 Ore.
473, 483-84, 373 P.2d 680, 686 (1962); Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 62-63, 460
P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1969).
4. The inperium in hnperio model contained in all editions of the Model State Con-
stitution published by the National Municipal League (NML) between 1921 and 1962 is
hereinafter referred to as the imnperio model. In its most recent edition, the NML has
preferred a legislative supremacy model with the inperio model as an alternative. See
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. VIII (6th ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as NML, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION].
5. "The familiar distinction between state and general concerns and municipal or
local affairs, with which courts are confronted in certain existing home rule states,
has not been susceptible to satisfactory application," AMERICAN MUNICIPAL LEAGUE
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named the National League of Cities (NLC), published a report, Model
Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule,6 which proposed
a different, though not entirely new or unique, approacl to home rule.
After reserving to cities themselves most of the procedural aspects of
home rule, administrative organization, and related matters, the proposed
model left allocation or determination of most substantive home rule
powers and functions to the state legislature.7 Information obtained from
replies to questionnaires sent by the author during the years 1970 and
1971 to directors of state municipal leagues and other interested students
of municipal government in the United States revealed no unanimity of
opinion concerning the utility of the report, or of the home rule model
proposed in it." Nevertheless, the NLC report has greatly influenced the
[National League of Cities], MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HoAIs
RULE 20 (1953) [hereinafter cited as NLC, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS]; "SIr-
periur in imperio is not a workable concept," reply to author's home rule question-
naire, Victor C. Hobday, Executive Director, Municipal Technical Advisory Service,
University of Tennessee, October 22, 1970. Although some municipal exercise of power
has been upheld under the bnperio doctrine, its critics point to the few powers actually
sustained and the involved legal proceedings often required to define the limits of
legitimate municipal action as substantially detracting from the validity of the doctrine.
See generally Westbrook, supra note 1, at 76.
6. Although the report was never officially approved by either the old AMA or its
Committee on Home Rule, it nonetheless represented the best available guide to con-
stitutional municipal home rule according to the AMA's Executive Director at the time
of its issuance. See NLC, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, supra note 5, at 3. The
home rule model contained therein is hereafter referred to as the NLC model. That
model is frequently associated with its principal author, Dr. Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean
Emeritus of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, although its basic thesis-state
legislative supremacy over cities in the substantive realm-is as old or older than the
concept of home rule itself. Perhaps its unique contribution is its attempt to reverse
Dillon's Rule by permitting municipal enactment of home rule ordinances absent con-
trary substantive state legislation. See note 16 infra. While the state legislature can
prohibit or nullify such enactments through prior or subsequent legislation, the model
precludes delay or denial of home rule by mere legislative inaction. There is no indi-
cation that the NLC intended the verbatim adoption of its home rule model, but con-
sidering in the aggregate all state constitutions in which portions of the model have
been included, virtually the entire model has been adopted.
Curiously, only four years prior to publication of its 1953 home rule report, the then
American Municipal Association published a study in which the inperio model was
advocated. See R. MoTr, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES (1949). Dr. Mott defined
home rule "as a relationship between the cities and the state in which the cities enjoy
the fullest authority to determine the organization, procedures, and powers of their
own governments, and a maximum of freedom from control by either the legislature
or state administrative officers." Id. at 5.
7. See note 13 infra & accompanying text.
8. Only a slight majority of respondents to the author's home rule questionnaire
preferred the NLC model to the imperio model. Excluding those which were ambiva-
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drafting of several newly adopted and revised constitutional provisions,
and may have stimulated the adoption of constitutional home rule, al-
though no concrete proof of this effect is available.' Its greatest impact
has been in states where home rule was not earlier authorized inasmuch
as of all imperio states, only Missouri has constitutionally substituted an
NLC provision for its existing imperio scheme.' In its sixth edition of
the Model State Constitution, the National Municipal League adopted as
its preferred model one very similar to that of the NLC. 1 Judging solely
lent or which expressed no preference, 38 replies were received; of these, 20 indicated
a preference for the NLC model.
9. In practice, home rule is virtually dormant or nonexistent in some states, though
authorized constitutionally or by statute in every state except Indiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. Legislative home rule, which obtains by mere statutory authorization, and the
constitutionality of which is uncertain until judicially upheld, is not widely practiced
except in New Jersey and Virginia, and possibly also in Wisconsin and Washington.
These latter two states additionally make constitutional provision for home rule. Con-
cerning legislative home rule, see Vanlandingham, supra note 1, at 273-77.
Provisions of some sort for home rule are contained presently in the constitutions of
40 states, twice the number having such provisions in 1953 when the NLC model was
proposed. See ALAS. CoNsT. art. X; ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 2-3; CAL. CONsT. art. XI,
§§ 3, 5-7; CoLO. CONT. art. XX; CONN. CONST. art. X; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(g),
2(b); GA. CONST. art. XV; HAWAII CoNsT. art. VII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2; ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 6; IowA CONST. art. III, § 40; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CONST.
art. VI; ME. CONST. art. VIII-A; MD. CoNsT. arts. XI-A, XI-E, XI-F; MASS. CONsT. art.
of amend. II; MICH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 22; MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Mo. CoNsr. art.
VI §§ 18(a)-(s), 19-19(a); MONT. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 5-6; NEB. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 2-5;
NEv. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; N.H. CoNsT. Pt. I, art. XXXIX; N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6;
N.Y. CONST. art. IX; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 130; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII; OKLA. CONST.
art. XVIII, §§ 3-4; ORE. CONST. art. XI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. of
amend. XXVIII; S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § I1; S.D. CoNs. art. IX, § 2; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 9; Tax. CoNsT. art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10-
11; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39(a); Wis. CoNST. art. XI, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. XIII, § I.
Although it is difficult to determine precisely the extent to which home rule powers
currently are exercised, with some few exceptions they appear more widely used in
states having the longest history of home rule. With time, cities in states which have more
recently enacted home rule likely will make more extensive use of their powers. Replies
to the author's questionnaire received during 1970 and 1971 and subsequently published
information have led the author to conclude that among the states with long-standing
home rule provisions, home rule has been most vigorously exercised in Michigan, Texas,
Ohio, Oregon, California, Minnesota, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Arizona, and among
states with more recent home rule enactments, in Maryland, Connecticut, Illinois, and
Alaska. Home rule powers also appear widely utilized in the legislative home rule states
of Virginia and New Jersey.
10. New York and Rhode Island have unsuccessfully attempted to adopt constitu-
tionally the NLC model.
i1. The text of the NML home rule provision, evidently borrowing from the NTLC
model, is contained in NML, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, art. VII, § 6:
A county or city may exercise any legislative power or perform any
function which is not denied to it by its charter, is not denied to counties
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from the number and content of constitutional provisions adopted since
its publication, the NLC model appears much more popular than the
imperio model as a plan for authorizing home rule.
Fordham-NLC Home Rule Theory
Dean Fordham, the principal author of the NLC model, apparently
became convinced of the validity of that approach to home rule through
his research of the records of the Ohio Constitutional Convention of
1912, wherein the present Ohio imperio provision was proposed. He re-
cently stated his inspiration for the NLC model:
It is very interesting that among the delegates at the [Ohio] con-
vention in 1912 was a member of the history faculty of the Ohio
State University, Professor George W. Knight, who articulated a
home rule theory which in much more recent years has had large
influence ....
Professor Knight believed that the constitutional grant of home
rule should not be like that in California. He espoused a broad
grant to municipalities, that were to have home rule status, of all
powers that the legislature might, within its plenary competence,
confer upon local government, always subject to the paramount
authority of the legislature to impose by general statute such limita-
tions, exceptions or exclusions as it should find desirable in the
general interest. In other words, a home rule charter municipality
would have a broad sweep of authority except as might be limited
by its charter or by general legislation. This dispensation would
generally eliminate the necessity of running to the legislature now
and again for enabling legislation as to this or that. It would, more-
over, impose political accountability upon the legislature for any
limitations it might impose.
This conception, it seemed to me, involved a very sound and
flexible approach, and I articulated it in a draft of Model Constitu-
tional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule in 1953. The 'Model'
was published by the American Municipal Association, now known
as the National League of Cities.12
or cities generally, or to counties or cities of its class, and is within such
limitations as the legislature may establish by general law. This grant of
home rule powers shall not include the power to enact private or civil law
governing civil relationships except as incident to an exercise of an inde-
pendent county or city power, nor shall it include power to define and
provide for the punishment of a felony.
12. Fordham, Ohio Constitutional Revision-What of Local Government? 33 OHIo
ST. L.J. 575, 579-80 (1972) (footnote omitted). The high turnover of membership in
19751
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Allocation of Powers-NLC Model
The most crucial portion of the NLC model is that which allocates
powers and functions between the state and home rule municipalities.
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter may
exercise any power or perform any function which the legislature
has power to devolve upon a non-home rule charter municipal cor-
poration and which is not denied to that municipal corporation by
its home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter municipal
corporations by statute and is within such limitations as may be
established by statute. This devolution of power does not include
the power to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships
except as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal
power, nor does it include power to define and provide for punish-
ment of a felony.
A home rule municipal charter corporation shall, in addition to its
home rule powers and except as otherwise provided in its charter,
have all the powers conferred by general law upon municipal corpo-
rations of its general class.
Charter provisions with respect to municipal executive, legislative
and administrative structure, organization, personnel and procedures
are of superior authority to statute, subject to the requirement that
the members of a municipal legislative body be chosen by popular
election and except as to judicial review of administrative proceed-
ings, which shall be subject to the superior authority of statute.13
some state legislatures raises some doubt as to the degree of political accountability of
state legislatures generally. See note 81 infra & accompanying text.
13. NLC, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PRovisioNS, supra note 5, at 19. The NLC model
(5 3) properly prohibits the enactment of special legislation for cities by suggesting
the establishment of a maximum of four classes based on population with no fewer than
two cities in a single class. While it has been said that the purpose of home rule is "to
minimize the need for special legislation," Littlefield, Municipal Home Rule-Connecti-
cut's Mature Approach, 37 CoNz.Nr. B.J. 390, 402 (1963), and while most states have long
had constitutional prohibitions of some sort against special legislation, only Massachu-
setts has constitutionally adopted the NLC stipulation. MAss. CoNsT. art. of amend. II,
§ 8. Although what is tantamount to special legislation is enacted occasionally, some-
times at municipal request, in almost every state, in the few states where home rule is
widely adopted and successfully practiced, especially Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Ore-
gon, Texas, and California, it has virtually ended special legislation. The vast majority
of states, however, follow the example of New York, where, despite its constitutional
provision which requires state legislation applicable to the "property, affairs or gov-
ernment of any local unit" to apply alike to all affected units by laws general in
"terms and effect," N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2(b) (2), home rule is often thwarted through
special legislation enactments disguised as general legislation in the form of "popula-
tion acts."
[Vol. 17:1
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Objective of the NLC Model
Beside seemingly offering wider opportunity for municipal exercise
of home rule initiative in permitting home rule cities to act in areas not
denied by state legislation, the NLC model shifts responsibility for de-
termining home rule powers and functions from the judiciary, where it
rests under imperio provisions, to the state legislature. Absent constitu-
tional or legislative prohibitions, then, municipalities authorized to exer-
cise home rule powers may exercise them free from judicial restraint. 4
Viable home rule thus depends upon successful lobbying by cities to
prevent enactment of anti-home rule legislation. The advocates of the
NLC model evidently believe prevention of such measures to be easier
than securing favorable decisions in the courts. This rationale apparently
rests upon two primary unproved and perhaps unprovable assumptions:
first, that imperio provisions are unworkable and have failed, and second,
that the state legislature is a more competent and trustworthy guardian
of home rule powers than the judiciary. A corollary premise is that
legislative control or determination of these powers will allow greater
flexibility in adjusting the state-municipal legal relationship. Such flex-
ibility is considered highly desirable in the present context of sophisti-
cated urban civilization and intricate patterns of local governmental
units.15 Whether provisions based on the NLC model will successfully
foster home rule remains to be seen, but at the least they preclude the
municipal excuse for inaction afforded by Dillon's Rule.'
14. Although a constitutional provision, however, may grant a home rule city all
powers not forbidden by the state constitution or by the state legislature, there may still
exist implied limitations on the authority of such a city to enact certain ordinances.
See, e.g., Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 552-53, 251 A.2d 761, 763-64
(1969); ",Vagner v. Mayor & Mun. Council, 24 N.J. 467, 480, 132 A.2d 794, 800 (1957).
Further, the judiciary always is responsible for resolving conflicts between state statutes
and municipal ordinances by determining when the state legislature has preempted the
municipal prerogative to legislate in a particular area. See notes 121-24 infra & accom-
panying text.
15. Fully aware of the various weaknesses inherent in the NLC model, but never-
theless believing it to be clearly the most flexible approach to local self-government,
the Montana Constitutional Convention adopted the principle of this model in the 1973
Montana Constitution. See Montana Commission on Local Government, Local Govt.
Rev. Bull. 134-37, Aug. 30, 1974.
16. Dillon's Rule stipulates that a municipal corporation possesses only those powers
expressly granted, fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-
tion. All reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power is to be resolved
against the corporation. See I J. DILLON, MU-NIc PAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
1975]
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Persistence of the lmperio Idea
Though the NLC model currently appears more popular than the
inperio model, 17 there is disagreement as to which model is preferable.
No state has adopted a strictly imperio provision since Utah did so in
1932, but the fact that several states have recently adopted provisions
combining features of both NLC and imperio models evidences strong
sentiment in favor of the imperio idea. These provisions express the
home rule grant in imperio language such as "municipal concerns, prop-
erty and government," and make it subject to state legislative suprem-
acy.18 Municipal home rule having been historically conceived as di-
rected solely to municipal affairs, it is perhaps logical and proper to draft
provisions in the irnperio style, but since such provisions limit the exer-
cise of home rule initiative to the area of the grant, the allowable scope
of home rule is seemingly not as broad as would be permitted by pro-
visions based strictly on the NLC principle of municipal initiative in all
areas not forbidden. "' Although somewhat logical inasmuch as the im-
perio idea seems inherent in the concept of home rule itself, provisions
which combine NLC and imperio features likely will have the effect of
defeating the broad intent of NLC proponents to lessen the role or in-
fluence of the judiciary in home rule. Such provisions not only will
necessitate the definition of home rule powers and functions, a task
NLC proponents believe almost impossible, but also will require a reso-
lution of conflicts between state and municipal governments arising from
disputed authority to exercise powers.
The influence of the NLC model on recently adopted home rule
provisions, and the controversy concerning the relative merits of the
NLC and imperio models, invites their study and comparison. Although
it has now been issued for some 22 years, the NLC concept has been the
17. See notes 8-11 supra & accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., MICH. Cos-sT. art. 7, § 22.
19. The NLC principle is embodied by the Pennsylvania provision which empowers
a home rule city to "exercise any power or perform any function not denied" by the
state constitution, by its home rule charter or by the state legislature. PA. CONST. art.
9, § 2. Similarly, the Alaska constitution empowers a home rule city to "exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter," ALAS. CoNsT. art. X, § 11; the
New Mexico constitution empowers a home rule city to "exercise all legislative powers
and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter," N.M.
CoNsr. art. X, § 6D; and the Montana constitution empowers a home rule city to
"exercise any power not prohibited by [the state] constitution, law, or charter," MO.NT.
Co,'sT. art. XI, § 6.
[Vol. 17:1
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subject of few interpretive judicial decisions. 0 Nonetheless, decisions
in a few states, especially Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Alaska, may
offer sufficient information to allow some evaluation of the NLC model
as well as a comparison of its viability and effectiveness with earlier pro-
visions based on the imperio construct.
THE NLC MODEL ANALYZED
Although advocates of the NLC model may consider an imperio pro-
vision antiquated and unworkable because of the language in which it is
phrased and because of the manner in which it attempts to confer home
rule authority, the NLC model itself presents serious practical, as well as
constitutional or legal, difficulties. Its most significant aspects are its
reversal of Dillon's Rule, its conferral of most procedural functions upon
home rule cities, a power generally accorded municipalities under imperio
provisions, and its subjection of most substantive home rule powers to
state legislative control. The absence of judicial interpretation of pro-
visions based on the NLC model has left much of the concept unclear
and unexplained.2 Most states which have adopted portions of it have
rephrased them in more traditional and perhaps more meaningful lan-
guage. The majority of provisions adopted in recent years are hybrids,
taken partially from the NLC model and partially from existing home
rule provisions. Since the phraseology of similar provisions differs great-
ly, the meaning of home rule accordingly varies from state to state. For
this reason discussion, in this article, of the various major provisions of
the NLC model cannot accurately describe home rule as it functions in
any particular jurisdiction. Its meaning in any given state must neces-
20. Lack of judicial interpretation may be explained in parr by the fact that provi-
sions based on the NLC model have been adopted only very recently. It is also pos-
sible, though by no means certain, that provisions based on the NLC model may
require less judicial interpretation than hnperio provisions.
21. Some state courts have adhered to a primary role confined to the decision of
actual controversies, and, avoiding constitutional questions whenever possible in reach-
ing decisions, have done little to explain the meaning of constitutional home rule pro-
visions. In Leavenworth Club Owners Ass'n v. Atchison, 208 Kan. 318, 492 P.2d 183
(1971), the Supreme Court of Kansas, finding no conflict between a state statute regu-
lating the serving of alcohol and a more restrictive city ordinance, declined to reach
the home rule issue. The court said, "This is not the occasion for a treatise construing
article 12, § 5 [the home rule provision] and defining the powers bestowed thereby
upon Kansas municipalities." Id. at 323, 492 P.2d at 187. One recent author has com-
mented, "Few people even after a decade of experience under Article 12, Section 5
really know what 'home rule' means in Kansas." Clark, State Control of Local Govern-
ment in Kansas: Special Legislation and Home Rule, 20 KA.. L. REv. 631 (1972).
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sarily derive from interpretations of its home rule scheme by the state
judiciary.
The NLC Home Rule Grant
In making the home rule grant the NLC model empowers a charter
(home rule) city to exercise any power or perform any function which
the legislature has power to devolve upon a non-home rule city, and
which is not denied to that city by its charter or by general law. Several
questions are raised by the language and the manner in which the grant
is stated.22 First, although the word "devolve," adopted only in the
North Dakota provision,23 obviously means "to transfer power or au-
thority to," its inclusion in a home rule provision seems somewhat inap-
propriate. According to an early opinion of the Supreme Court of
California, "instances of [the] appropriate use [of "devolve"] are found
when speaking of the succession of estates upon death, or upon a change
of official incumbents; also in proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency,
whereby the act or operation of law the estate of the bankrupt devolves
upon his assignee." 24 The United States Constitution uses the word
"devolve" to describe the transfer of powers from the President to the
Vice President. While its use in a home rule provision is perhaps a
trivial matter and evidently has no legal significance, it is submitted that
"grant," "delegate," or "confer" would have been more meaningful.
Second, as Dean Fordham has admitted, it is not known precisely
what powers the legislature may devolve upon a non-home rule city.
2 1
Such powers are likely broad, but they may not be unlimited. It may
be that because of the local or municipal idea inherent in the concept of
home rule, only local or municipal powers may be conferred. That in-
terpretation would be tantamount to reading the imperio concept into
the NLC model, since while home rule may be difficult to define, it
usually does not encompass the exercise of state powers by home rule
22. The provision making the grant is set out at the text accompanying note 13 supra.
23. N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 130.
24. Francisco v. Aguirre, 94 Cal. 180, 185, 29 P. 495, 497 (1892). See also Babcock v.
Maxwell, 29 Mont. 31, 35, 74 P. 64, 66 (1903).
25. U.S. Co-sr. art. 2, § 1, cl. 6.
26. Fordham, Local Govenmwent in the Larger Scbeme of Things, 8 VANND. L. REv.
667, 676 (1955).
27. It has been held that a state legislature cannot delegate authority to district courts
to decide annexation cases. See City of Carringron v. Foster Count,, 166 N.WV.2d 377
(N.D. 1969).
[Vol. 17:1
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cities.2" Indeed, the Alaska and New Mexico Supreme Courts have al-
ready imported the state-municipal dichotomy into their home rule pro-
visions, provisions very similar in principle to the NLC model. Despite
the language of the Alaska provision, which empowers a home rule
borough or city to exercise all legislative power not prohibited by law
or charter, the Alaska court said that the power of a home rule munici-
pality to enforce an ordinance which conflicts with a state statute depends
upon whether the matter regulated is of state-wide or local concern.29
That court had earlier adopted what it called the "local activity rule,"
which was virtually the old state-versus-local test used in imperio states
to resolve conflicts between state statutes and municipal ordinances.30
The New Mexico home rule provision stipulates that "[a] municipality
which adopts a charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform
all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter." 31 In
Apodaca v. Wilson3 2 the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the
right of the city of Albuquerque to levy increased sewage and water
service charges on the ground that management of sewage and water
facilities was local in character. The court found the term "general
28. It seems paradoxical that while some provisions, such as those of Alaska and New
Mexico, expressly state "maximum local self-government" as their purpose, see note 1
supra, they further authorize home rule cities to exercise all powers, including presum-
ably state powers, not forbidden by the state legislature. These provisions imply great
faith in the state legislature's competence to prevent municipal governments from inter-
fering in state affairs. By contrast, judicial interpretation in some inperio states allows
home rule cities to act upon state matters until forbidden by state law. See notes 108-12
infra & accompanying text.
29. Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alas. 1971).
30. See Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d 115, 122 (Alas. 1970), in
which it was held that the city of Anchorage could not deny Chugach a permit to
extend its services into the city limits after Chugach had obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the state public service commission. This decision was
criticized in Sharp, Home Rule in Alaska: A Clash Between the Constitution and the
Court, 3 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1973). Sharp contended that by reading the
iMperio doctrine into the Alaska provision, the Supreme Court of Alaska acted contrary
to the intentions of the authors of the state constitution. The decision of the court
would appear correct inasmuch as it had been anticipated earlier. See note 38 infra &
accompanying text.
The Alaska court subsequently decided a case involving conflict between a state
statute and a municipal ordinance without mentioning the "local activity rule." See
Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37 (Alas. 1974). In its opinion the court stated, "The test
we derive from Alaska's constitutional provisions is one of prohibition, rather than
traditional tests such as statewide versus local concern." Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Connor reaffirmed his support of the "local activities"
rule. Id. at 44.
31. N.M. CoxsT. art. X, , 6D.
32. 86 N.M. 516, 525 P.2d 876 (1974).
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law" as stated in the provision to mean "a law that applies generally
throughout the state, or is of statewide concern as contrasted to 'local'
or 'municipal' law." 3 The court looked to the interpretations of imperio
provisions by other state courts, and adopted the Oregon rule that
" '[w] hile a general law supersedes a municipal charter or ordinance in
conflict therewith,... the subject matter of the general legislative enact-
ment must pertain to those things of general concern to the people of
the state. A law general in form cannot ... deprive cities of the right to
legislate on purely local affairs germane to the purposes for which the
city was incorporated.' "34 Thus despite the plain language of the New
Mexico provision empowering the state legislature to deny altogether
to home rule cities the right to exercise all legislative powers and to per-
form all functions, the court has effectively extinguished that power
where functions and powers are local or municipal in character. This
decision will impose upon the court the task of classifying governmental
powers and functions into state and municipal categories. 35 The possibil-
ity of a reading of the state-municipal dichotomy into the recently
adopted Missouri provision has been raised,36 and some decisions of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts indicate that that court eventu-
ally may move in that direction.37 Such an interpretation would place
33. Id. at 521, 525 P.2d at 881. The court, however, failed to elaborate upon its appar-
ent distinction between a law of state application and a law of statewide concern, H.
McBAIN, supra note 1, at 636-37. The problem could have been avoided had the con-
stitutional provision itself defined "general law."
34. 86 N.M. at 522, 525 P.2d at 882, quoting City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286,
296, 59 P.2d 228, 232 (1936).
35. In its opinion the court also noted the phrase "not expressly denied" and took it
"to mean that some express statement of the authority or power denied must be con-
tained in ...general . ..or otherwise no limitation exists." 86 N.M. at 521-22, 525
P.2d at 881-82. This view is similar to that of Antieau. See note 45 infra & accompany-
ing text. Implied preemption was not involved in this case, nor did the court indicate
an awareness of the difficulties involved in the preemption question.
Apodaca illustrates the difficulty courts have in avoiding the influence of earlier
rnperio decisions. From the opinion in this case, it appears that the New Mexico court
was wholly unfamiliar with the theory underlying the NLC model.
36. See Comment, State-Local Conflicts Under the New Missouri Home Rule Amend-
ment, 37 Mo. L. REv. 677, 692 (1972). Thus far, the Missouri provision has not been
litigated extensively. Without referring to it, a Missouri court of appeals decision in-
volving county home rule based on the hiperio doctrine established that a county home
rule charter provision relating to a private or local matter prevailed over a conflicting
state statute. State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Campbell, 498 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973). Missouri may be unique in having an inperio provision for county home rule
and a legislative supremacy provision for municipal home rule.
37. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547 (1969); Belin v. Secre-
tary of the Comm., 288 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1972). The first decision found a matter
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states with provisions based on the NLC model in much the same predic-
ament as those with imperio provisions, a position the authors of the NLC
model sought to avoid. 8
The absence of a specific imperio grant in the NLC model, as well as
in provisions based on, or similar to, the NLC model, such as those of
Alaska, New Mexico, Montana, and Pennsylvania, poses a difficult prob-
lem by obfuscating the line of demarcation between state and municipal
authority to exercise powers. This problem has existed since the incep-
tion of home rule itself, and has never received an entirely satisfactory
answer. One solution is judicial reading of the state-municipal dichotomy
or the imperio concept into NLC-type provisions, but such an approach
alters or defeats the intent and purpose of the creators of the NLC model.
Another solution might be the enactment of a state code of restrictions
on home rule initiative. The 1967 draft New York State Constitution
contained a provision based in part on the NLC model and provided
that home rule powers could be exercised only during the period when
such a code of restrictions was in effect.3 9 Although the New York
provision may represent the best approach, the preparation and enact-
ment of a fully effective code presents significant difficulties, especially
in older states with considerable statutory law governing municipalities,
where codification would necessitate a great deal of time and expense
and might encounter substantial opposition from municipal officials fear-
ing loss of municipal autonomy.4° Further, legislative inability to foresee
conflict between a code and legislation both present and future may
render the code ineffective at times.41 Nevertheless, enactment of a code
covered by a proposed law to be sufficiently a state concern and therefore open to state
legislation; the second blocked the effectuation of a statute which the court first deter-
mined to involve a municipal interest (proportional representation), and then found it
to be impermissible special legislation.
38. Such interpretations were foreseen, however. See Vanlandingham, supra note 1;
Office of the (Alaska) Governor, Home Rule in Alaska, ALAs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
Aug. 1962, at 4; E. Rusco, Municipal Home Rule: Guidelines for Idaho, 1960, at 47
(Research Memorandum published by Bureau of Public Affairs Research, University of
Idaho). This judicial interpretation of legislative supremacy provisions, such as that of
Alaska, has given them much the same meaning as the imperio provisions of Colorado
and California. Compare notes 29-30 supra & accompanying text 'with Vela v. People,
174 Colo. 465, 466-67, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205 (1971) and CEEED v. California Coastal Zone
Conserv. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 320, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1974).
39. Draft N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 2(b), published in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at
25, col. 6. This draft was rejected in a referendum vote.
40. Cf. Comment, State-Local Conflicts Under the New Missouri Home Rule Amend-
ment, 37 Mo. L. REv. 677, 683-84 (1972).
41. Following the decision in Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d
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appears desirable even though it may later prove defective and require
amendment. Failure or neglect of the state legislature to draw a clear
line between state and municipal authority to exercise powers could
pave the way for abuse of municipal initiative and result in a disruption
of state-municipal relations. The NLC report itself is somewhat incon-
sistent in this area, inasmuch as the text of the model does not contain
the word "expressly," yet in the explanatory comment it is stated that a
home rule city may exercise any appropriate power or function unless
expressly limited by charter or general statute.42 The term "appropriate
power or function" is left undefined, but in view of the home rule grant
supplied in the model, it apparently means any power or function which
the state legislature has authority to devolve upon a non-home rule city.
As earlier noted, the extent of a state legislature's authority to devolve
power upon such a city remains judicially undetermined.43
Constitutional provisions based on the NLC model evidence an aware-
ness that the NLC text does not contain the word "expressly." Although
the New Mexico and Illinois provisions do include the term or its equiv-
alent,44 it is absent from other recently adopted provisions. The inclu-
sion or omission of the term has considerable bearing on cases involving
state-versus-municipal authority to exercise powers, inasmuch as there
exists authority for the proposition that, absent an expressed legislative
prohibition, municipal home rule enactments should be judicially up-
held.45 Regardless of whether a provision specifies the manner of legisla-
115 (Alas. 1970), see note 30 supra, the Alaska municipal code was rewritten and re-
adopted. The restrictions imposed on municipalities are set out in ALASKA STAT.,
§ 29.13.100 (1972 & Supp. 1974).
42. Dean Fordham has reiterated the position of the explanatory comment. See Ford-
ham, Local Governnment in the Larger Scheme of Things, 8 VAND. L. REV. 667, 676
(1955); Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT. MuN. REV. 137, 140 (1955).
43. See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
44. See N.M. CONsT. art. X, § 6D, ILL. CoNsT. art. VII, § 6(i). For discussion of the
Illinois preemption provision, see note 52 infra & accompanying text.
45. See generally I C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAWV, § 5.41, at 5-125 to
5-126 (1975). The approach to the complex problem of preemption offered by both
Antieau and drafters of the NLC model appears to be too simplistic. Permitting a home
rule unit to do whatever is not expressly forbidden by the state legislature does not
often lend to a satisfactory resolution of the preemption issue. See notes 46-51 infra
& accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Alaska has declined to deal with this
problem as one of preemption by treating it rather as involving resolution of conflict
between a state statute and municipal ordinance. See, e.g., Macauley v. Hildebrand,
491 P.2d 120 (Alas. 1971); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d 115,
121 (Alas. 1970); Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470, 475 (Alas. 1969). The pre-
emption doctrine has been widely applied by the Supreme Court of California. See,
e.g., In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962). According to
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tive proscriptidn, the neglect or failure of a state legislature to circum-
scribe the home rule enactments should not necessarily require auto-
matic judicial sanction of municipal action. There are some circum-
stances in which the judiciary must act to protect the rights and interests
of the larger community, the state.4" Home rule cities can be neither
permitted to enact ordinances having substantial impact on citizens living
beyond their territorial borders,47 nor allowed to enact ordinances on
matters requiring uniform state regulation.48 Further, the idea that the
tension between state and municipal interests can be resolved by express
legislative prohibition presumes too great wisdom and knowledge on the
part of the state legislature. Despite judicial doctrine that a state legisla-
ture is presumed to have knowledge of its own previous enactments, 49
actual experience demonstrates a not uncommon absence of such knowl-
edge. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for a leg-
islature to anticipate completely the impact of each enactment upon ex-
isting state law and on municipal ordinances.50 Stating that it would
place "an unwarranted burden upon the state legislature and would ac-
complish very little," the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected the argu-
ment that the legislature should label each piece of state legislation in-
tended to limit the power of home rule cities; the court further said it
was not within its province to specify the form in which the legislature
should enact laws."' Although highly desirable and perhaps necessary,
one California court the term "preemption" (also sometimes called "occupation of the
field doctrine") means that "where the legislature has adopted a scheme for the regu-
lation of a given subject, local legislative control over such phases of the subject as are
covered by state legislation ceases." Alta-Dena Dairy v. County of San Diego, 271 Cal.
App. 2d 66, 75, 76 Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 (1969).
46. "There is within a municipality no political pressure to check the enactment of
ordinances adverse to the interest of the state and, if the state legislature is unwilling
or unable to preclude municipal enactments, the judiciary is the only available pro-
tector of the state's interest." Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal
Ordinances, 72 HARv. L. REv. 737, 747 (1959).
47. See, e.g., Village of Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 371, 148
N.E.2d 921, 923 (1958); City of Bucyrus v. Department of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 427,
166 N.E. 370, 371 (1929).
48. See, e.g., Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 553, 251 A.2d 761, 763-64
(1969); In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 371, 173 A.2d 233, 239 (1961).
49. See, e.g., Cook v. Ward, 381 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Brewer v.
Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174, 249 A.2d 388, 391 (1969); Township of Chester v. Panicucci,
116 N.J. Super. 229, 237, 281 A.2d 811, 815 (1971). The problems engendered by high
state legislative turnover are discussed at note 81 infra & accompanying text.
50. See note 41 supra & accompanying text.
51. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d 115, 120 (Alas. 1970). In
his concurring opinion to a subsequent decision by the same court, Justice Connor said:
A home rule concept which relies only on express prohibition to define
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a state-enacted code of restrictions on home rule municipalities may not
prove entirely satisfactory by reason of this same inability to foresee the
future impact of legislation. Of course, judicial decisions can always
trigger corrective action by the legislature.
During the brief period of constitutional home rule in Illinois, the
Illinois General Assembly has attempted to indicate its intent to preempt
powers otherwise secured to home rule cities. This constitutionally-
required legislative procedure, though at times raising questions concern-
ing proper labeling of bills, has apparently worked satisfactorily.52 Obvi-
ously, in these and in other states questions of state-municipal conflict or
state preemptions will continually arise, and their only resolution appears
to lie with the judiciary acting on an ad hoc basis.
State Enactment of Private Law Governing Civil Relationships
Another troublesome aspect of the NLC model, contained in the same
section as the home rule grant, is the stipulation that, "[t] his devolution
of power does not include the power to enact private or civil law govern-
ing civil relationships except as an incident to an exercise of an inde-
pendent municipal power." 53 This provision, likely considered a neces-
sary limitation of the broad grant of authority, apparently including the
the scope of local power presupposes a degree of legislative foresight and
draftsmanship ability which is completely unrealistic.
Those who advocate that the conflict between statutes and ordinances
should be resolved by simply holding in favor of home rule in all instances
where the legislature has not stated an express prohibition are seeking an
illusionary, unworkable solution to a problem which is quite complex and
which is, like many things in modern life, not susceptible to decision by
mere slogans or mechanical formulae.
Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 45-46 (Alas. 1974) (concurring opinion).
52. The Illinois constitution contains a very complex preemption provision, not yet
entirely judicially interpreted. By a three-fifths majority vote of each house, the gen-
eral assembly may deny to home rule counties or cities the right to exercise a power
not exercised by the state. A three-fifths majority vote in each house is also required
to deny or limit taxing powers, other than those specifically accorded or limited by
the constitution. General laws of statewide concern may be passed by a simple major-
ity vote of each house and will prohibit local enactment of ordinances bearing upon
the subject matter of the legislation. Except where specifically limited by the general
assembly, home rule units may exercise powers concurrently with the state. In sum-
mary, almost any area can be preempted by the state legislature, but the three-fifths
voting requirement makes preemption of powers not exercised by the state and taxing
powers difficult. See ILL. CoNST. art. VII, §§ 6(g)-(i). See also Cole, Illinois Home Rule
in Perspective, in HoME RurF Ix ILLINOIS 19 (S. Cole & S. Gove eds. 1973) (background
paper prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule held April 5-7, 1973).
53. NLC, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, supra note 5, § 4 at 19.
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police power, has been constitutionally adopted only in Massachusetts,5 4
Louisiana,55 and New Mexico,50 and statutorily enacted by Iowa,57 Dela-
ware,58 Georgia,59 and Montana. 60 Although its meaning has been the
subject of some speculation, its obvious intent, as noted in the NLC
report, is to protect private rights against possible municipal infringe-
ment."' According to Dean Fordham, "It is perfectly plain that we do
not want to devolve upon local government independent authority to
enact private law. To have contract law or property law vary from city
to city would be horrendous. At the same time, the exercise of any one
of a number of important powers, whether taxing, regulatory or whatnot,
necessarily bears upon civil relationships." 62
This provision has been judicially construed only by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which, taking note of its novel language,
ruled that absent specific enabling legislation, a city could not enact a
rent control ordinance pursuant to its home rule authority. 3 Although
the Massachusetts home rule provision was read as conferring the police
power upon cities, 64 it appears likely that this particular provision will
operate to inhibit or impede the exercise of such power. Uncertainty
concerning the impact specific measures will have on private civil rela-
tionships may force municipalities to seek enabling legislation for many
desired police power measures.65 The result will be effectively a restora-
tion of Dillon's Rule in the area of police power, and a consequent in-
54. MAss. CONST. art. of amend. II, § 7.
55. LL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 9(A). It is further provided that "the police power of the
state shall never be abridged." Id. art. VI, § 9(B).
56. N.M. CoNsT. art. X, § 6D. Additionally, the limitation has been incorporated by
the NML Model State Constitution. See note 11 supra.
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.1 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 802 (1974).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1018(b) (Supp. 1974).
60. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 47A-7-201 (1) (Interim Supp. 1975).
61. NLC, M11ODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, supra note 5, at 21.
62. Letter from Jefferson B. Fordham to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Feb. 22, 1973.
63. Marshal House Inc. v. Rent Rev. & Griev. Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200
(1970). The same court subsequently held municipal zoning to be an independent
municipal power that could be exercised only consistent with general state law. Board
of App. v. Housing App. Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 409 (Mass. 1973).
64. See Marshal House Inc. v. Rent Rev. & Griev. Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 717-18, 260
N.E.2d 200, 206 (1970). The Massachusetts court's conclusion that the home rule pro-
vision confers the state police power upon cities may not be followed in other states;
since the power is state in character, an argument may be made that such power can-
not be delegated to home rule cities absent specific enabling legislation. See notes 26-28
supra & accompanying text.
65. Cf. Comment, Municipal Home Rule Power: Impact on Private Legal Relation-
ships, 56 IoWA L. REv., 631, 642-43 (1971).
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crease in the workload of the state legislature. Inclusion of the NLC
limitation in a home rule structure may be unnecessary since the vast
majority of home rule states, including some with provisions based largely
on the NLC model, generally function very well without it. 6 Most mat-
ters which it seeks to remove from municipal jurisdiction are state func-
tions rather than local, and would ordinarily be denied municipalities
since, regardless of what a home rule provision specifies, courts cannot
sanction parochial enactments on subjects which, by their nature, demand
uniform treatment throughout the state.37 Further, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and sim-
ilar provisions of state constitutions, should afford sufficient protection
to private rights against municipal infringement without the specific
limitation stated in the NLC model. Municipalities, of course, must be
delegated some authority to exercise the police power inherent in state
government, but they should also be required to act by means consistent
with general state law.68
State Legislative Control of Home Rule
Apart from constitutional questions, the principal objection to the
NLC model is that it makes most substantive home rule powers depend
solely upon state legislative grace. 9 While preferring the NLC model to
the imperia model, one respondent to the author's home rule question-
naire remarked, "In a state with no effective home rule tradition, it may
produce almost complete control by the legislature." 70 This aspect of
66. South Dakota constitutionally adopted the limiting provision in 1962, but aban-
doned it ten years later. See S.D. CoNsT. art. X, § 5 (1963); id. art. IX, § 2 (1972).
67. See notes 44-46 supra & accompanying text. Cities themselves are generally aware
that there are some subjects upon which they cannot legislate. It has been noted that
"by common understanding such general subjects as crime, domestic relations, wills and
administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and personal property, insurance, bank-
ing, corporations, and many others have never been regarded by anyone, least of all
the cities themselves, as appropriate subjects of local control. No city has been so
foolhardy as to venture generally into any of these fields of law. It has simply been
universally accepted that these matters are strictly of 'state concern.'" H. McBAIN,
supra note 1, at 673-74.
68. A widely borrowed California constitutional provision is directed toward this
end. It stipulates: "A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws."
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
69. See Keith, Sharing of Powers, 56 NAT. Civic REv. 621, 624 (1967). Because he
believes it the more flexible approach to home rule, Keith prefers the NLC to the
imperio model. Id. at 623-24.
70. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire, Russell W. Maddox, Department of
Political Science, Oregon State University, Spring, 1971. Another respondent noted,
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the NLC construct is not far removed from a state legislative grant of
home rule whereby the legislature retains complete control of home
rule powers and functions, and really amounts to little more than con-
stitutional authorization for the legislature to delegate home rule powers
to cities.71 An argument can be made that the NLC approach is predi-
cated on expediency inasmuch as there is little disagreement with the
proposition that the procedural aspects of home rule are properly munici-
pal concerns, but the difficult problem of defining substantive home rule
powers and functions is left to the state legislature. This allocation of
functions seems particularly inappropriate in light of Dean Fordham's
statement that "[i] n a sense, home rule is a recognition of state legislative
weakness and an effort to escape its effects." 72 To avoid legislative
hamstringing of home rule cities, California amended its constitution in
1896 to exempt home rule ordinances pertaining to municipal affairs from
the operation of state laws.7 The NLC scheme seems to have reversed
that development. Finally, since some degree of municipal freedom from
state legislative control is inherent in the concept of home rule, one
might question whether the governmental status defined by the NLC
model is worthy of the name "home rule." 7
"The most glaring weakness of the Fordham proposal [NLC model] is that it grants
cities no protection from a temporary legislative majority." Letter from Chester Biesen,
Executive Director, Association of Washington Cities, to Kenneth Vanlandingham,
Oct. 5, 1970. Distrust of the state legislature was evidenced by the Illinois constitutional
convention which adopted a proposal requiring a three-fifths majority vote in each
house before powers not exercised by the state and taxing powers could be preempted.
See note 52 supra.
71. Cf. GA. CONsr. art. XV, § 1. The Georgia provision expressly authorizes the state
general assembly "to delegate its powers so that matters pertaining to municipalities upon
which, prior to the ratification of this amendment, it was necessary for the General
Assembly to act, may be dealt with without the necessity of action by the General
Assembly.' Prior to this amendment, the Supreme Court of Georgia had held uncon-
stitutional a legislative act delegating home rule powers to cities. See Phillips v. City
of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953).
Similarly, the Connecticut constitutional provision stipulates: "The general assembly
shall by general law delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems
appropriate to towns, cities and boroughs relative to the powers, organization, and form
of government of such political subdivisions.' CONN. Corsr. art. X, § 1.
72. Fordham, Introduction, Sympositm-Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Gov-
ernnental Concepts, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 442 (1957) (footnote omitted).
73. CALu. CoNsr. art. XI, § 6 (1896). California retained its imperio version of home
rule when a revised local government amendment was adopted in 1970. CAL. CoNSr.
art. XI, § 5 (1970). Its failure to adopt a provision based on the NLC model may have
been "a result of inertia plus the fear of doing things which were too drastic." Letter
from Sho Sato, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, to Kenneth E.
Vanlandingham, March 13, 1973.
74. It is difficult for the author to characterize power as "home rule" when it may
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The NLC model places great faith in the competence of the state leg-
islature to deal effectively with municipal problems in delegating to it the
regulation of the state-municipal legal relationship by dictating the sub-
stance of home rule. On the basis of past and present experience such
faith may be misplaced. During the century that constitutional home
rule has been authorized, legislative supremacy provisions similar in prin-
ciple to the NLC model have achieved only limited or mixed success.
With some qualification, they appear to have been successful in Mich-
igan75 and Texas,76 but far from satisfactory in Washington7 7 and West
be rescinded by a mere majority vote of the state legislature. Meaningful home rule
must incorporate the concept of federalism within the state-municipal context. It should
be recalled that the reading of the imperio doctrine into the Missouri home rule pro-
vision carved out an area of municipal independence which otherwise would have been
foreclosed by the complete legislative supremacy implied by the language of the pro-
vision. See note 1 supra.
75. The description given home rule by the Supreme Court of Michigan in City of
Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919), correctly states the present
status of Michigan home rule: "Political experiment has not yet produced in this state
the autonomous city-a little state within the state. We have a system of state govern-
ment, and the right of local self-government is, and always has been, a part of the
system." Id. at 261, 175 N.W. at 483. A veteran observer of Michigan home rule noted:
"The Michigan Municipal League has had to exert constant effort over the decades to
promote favorable enabling amendments to home rule acts, and to prevent attempts of
certain legislators to erode established municipal powers. In 1965, after a reapportion-
ment based on one man, one vote, the Michigan legislature, although urban in char-
acter, passed as an amendment to an act of 1925 a restrictive maximum duty hour law
for firemen-which is binding on home-rule cities. The Michigan system is not fool-
proof against the state general law approach to municipal problems by way of pro-
hibitions and restrictions." Bromage, Home Rule: Progress or Retrogression, OHio
CMEs & VILLAGE-s, Dec. 1965, at 5. As of 1965, with 209 cities and 53 village charters,
Michigan led the nation in the number of charter adoptions.
76. The Texas provision, as judicially construed, permits home rule cities to exercise
all powers not forbidden with unmistakable clarity by the state legislature. See City
of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964). Recently, however, the
Texas legislature occasionally has preempted areas which the Texas Municipal League
considered reserved to home rule cities. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire,
Riley E. Fletcher, General Counsel, Texas Municipal League, fall 1971.
77. Home rule in Washington, as in Michigan and West Virginia, is a matter of
legislative grace. The greatest complaint of the Association of Washington Cities is that
this kind of home rule tends to result in the imposition of undue financial burdens on
home rule cities for the benefit of municipal employees, who, aided by powerful labor
unions, constitute a strong lobby in the state legislature. Letter from Chester Biesen,
Executive Director, Association of Washington Cities, to Kenneth Vanlandingham,
Jan. 11, 1971. This is a problem common to cities in other states, which even may
arise under imperio provisions, especially in the area of law enforcement. A solution,
however, is afforded by § 10 of the NLC model which prevents state legislation requir-
ing increased municipal expenditures from taking effect in any city until approved
by its council unless the legislation is enacted by a two-thirds vote of all members of
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Virginia.7" Home rule under such provisions is effective only where the
state legislature, motivated either by a belief that home rule is good pub-
lic policy or by pressure from strong state municipal leagues, exercises
self-restraint and wisdom in guarding home rule prerogatives. The ex-
perience in some states makes this condition perhaps too much to expect.'9
Absent contrary constitutional provisions state legislatures legally possess
plenary authority over cities,80 but it nonetheless may not be desirable to
entrust the granting of home rule powers to them. One executive di-
rector of a southern state municipal league in his reply to the author's
home rule questionnaire stated, "So far, we have few statesmen in our
legislature." This observation likely applies to many other state legisla-
tures as well. Membership turnover is very high with possibly 50 per-
cent of first term legislators failing either to seek or to secure reelection.,'
Not only are many legislators evidently inexperienced in dealing with
each house of the state legislature, or unless funds sufficient to cover the increased
expenditure are appropriated for the city in the same legislative session.
78. Under a provision borrowed almost verbatim from the 1908 Michigan consti-
tution, West Virginia has had very little success with home rule, for its legislature has
delegated to home rule cities no significant powers not granted non-home rule cities.
West Virginia cities adopt home rule primarily in order to change to a council-manager
form of government. See Vanlandingham, nipra note 1, at 295. The atmosphere at
both state and local levels appears unfavorable for viable home rule. As of 1971, there
existed no active state municipal league to lobby for municipal interests, and consid-
eration and enactment of special legislation constituted at least one-fourth of the work-
load of each annual legislative session. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire, West
Virginia Legislative Services, Feb. 26, 1971. For additional comment on West Virginia
home rule, see E. ELKINs, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN WEST VIRGINIA (1965), the
appendix to which includes a proposed imperio home rule amendment with stipulation
of some home rule powers submitted in 1963 by the West Virginia Commission on
Constitutional Revision. Id. at 50-51.
79. One reviewer has noted, "[Liegislative dominance of local concerns in general
and big city affairs in particular always has been a universal phenomenon of American
politics. The historical 'father knows best' type of state-local relationship, whereby
municipalities possess few or no rights of self-government and exist virtually at the
pleasure of the legislature, is legion. Boston is no special case. The heavy hand of
the state legislature is still felt today, even after some home rule gains, and even though
the Irish Democrats, rather than the Yankee Republicans, now dominate the legisla-
ture... ." Gere, Book Review, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 623, 624 (1973).
80. See I J. DILLoN, supra note 16, § 237; City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R.,
24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
81. See J. STRAAYER, AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 92 (1973). Although
the rate of turnover is unquestionably high (in the 1960's nearly double that of the
United States Congress), Straayer's figure may be somewhat inflated. Another recent
study, surveying the period 1963-1971, found overall turnover in the 50 state senates
to be 30.4% and overall turnover in the 49 state houses (Nebraska having a unicameral
legislature) to be 36.1%. See Rosenthal, Legislative Turnover in the States, 47 STATE
Gov'T 148, 149 (1974). In any event, legislative turnover, which varies considerably
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municipal problems, but as part of a body which is frequently highly
partisan, they are beset by special interest groups that often can exert
greater influence upon representatives than can state municipal leagues
or the cities themselves. Moreover, the selection of many municipal of-
ficials on nonpartisan ballots may render them ineffective lobbyists with
the state legislature. For these reasons, questions may be raised concern-
ing both the competence and willingness of state legislatures fairly to
represent municipal interests. One respondent to the author's home rule
questionnaire stated, "I simply do not believe that the legislature can be
counted on to represent adequately the municipal interest, and I think
that local action to preserve that interest is desirable, with reliance on
judicial review to curb abuses." 82
Historically, the state legislature, jealous of its legislative prerogatives,
seldom has been an ardent advocate of home rule. Since the Missouri
Constitutional Convention of 1875, home rule frequently has originated
with or proceeded from constitutional conventions rather than from
amendments proposed by state legislatures.8 3 It is difficult to ascertain
whether without the initiative of those conventions home rule would be
as widespread as it is at present. However, Illinois and Montana finally
authorized home rule in 1970 and 1972 respectively only through the
ratification of new state constitutions, and Indiana, currently the most
among the states, id., is sufficiently high in some instances to affect adversely the legis-
lative process, and raises questions concerning the political accountability of the state
legislature, the body which in NTLC states has virtually complete control over sub-
stantive home rule powers. Of course, this assertion assumes without empirical proof
that experience is preferable to inexperience in state legislators. One writer has noted
that in comparison with the United States Congress the average state legislature lacks a
corps of career legislators. See K. PALMER, STATE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 65-66
(1972).
Dean Fordham, nevertheless, apparently has no little faith in the competence of the
state legislature to grant home rule powers to cities. He recently stated, "To denigrate
state legislatures as weak institutions is unimpressive. They are central, basic policymaking
and power distribution centers and the obvious positive approach is both to strengthen
and to trust them." Letter from Jefferson B. Fordham to Dale A. Harris, Acting
Director, Montana Commission on Local Government, March 22, 1974 (quoted by
permission). Granting the correctness of his conception, some doubt remains as to
whether the state legislature can fulfill its role adequately where home rule preroga-
tives are involved.
82. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire, Maurice H. Merrill, Emeritus Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Oklahoma, Jan. 22, 1971.
83. States in which home rule was initiated by limited or unlimited constitutional
conventions include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut (pre-existing legislative
home rule still in effect), Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington. Oregon adopted it by popular constitutional
initiative. Kentucky rejected a constitution providing for home rule in 1966.
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populous non-home rule state, has never succeeded in adopting it despite
the introduction of numerous resolutions on the subject since 1937.14
It has been assumed that granting municipalities proportional repre-
sentation in the state legislature would make that body more sympathetic
to urban problems. This viewpoint was expressed indirectly by an early
critic of the NLC model:
One might be willing to give more acceptance to the AMA
[NLC] model if there were greater assurance, overall, of the reap-
portionment of state legislatures in the direction of greater urban
representation. A state legislature representing urban populations
more accurately might be entrusted with the kind of 'life or death'
discretion over a municipal home rule power, delineated in the
AMA [NLC] model.8 5
More equitable representation for cities subsequently was assured by
the landmark one-man, one-vote decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr" and Reynolds v. Sins.8  In- retrospect it appears
that these decisions may not provide the long sought panacea of making
state legislatures more responsive to urban problems of cities, nor may
they prevent legislative meddling in the internal affairs of cities. Many
who advocated more equitable political representation for cities prior
to Baker v. Carr, in the belief that the result would improve municipal
leverage, failed to anticipate future population movements within the
metropolitan region. The 1970 census revealed that for the first time,
total suburban population exceeded that of the central cities. 8 Although
both central cities and suburban areas are urban in character, their popu-
lations have different social, economic, and racial characteristics, and
hence different political interests. Suburban residents, including many
84. As of 1971, there had been 11 unsuccessful attempts during 16 previous sessions
of the Indiana General Assembly to institute constitutional home rule. An observer has
noted that the Indiana legislature would never consider an hnperio authorization, but
might consider the NLC model for the reason that it could control home rule. Reply
to author's home rule questionnaire, Arden R. Chilcote, Local Government Research
Analyst, Indiana Legislative Council, Feb. 9, 1971. Mayors of Indiana cities have opposed
home rule adoption, believing that it will foster the development of council-manager
government. C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AmERIcA 205 (4th ed. 1972).
Ironically, West Virginia cities opt for home rule for the purpose of adopting council
manager government. See note 78 supra.
85. Bromage, Home Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT. MuN. REV. 132, 135 (1955).
86. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
87. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
88. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF
POPULATION 1-180 (1972) (Table 34).
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emigrants from the urban core, are evidently as hostile toward the cen-
tral city as the farmer allegedly has been. 9
Very few respondents to the author's home rule questionnaire believe
that political reapportionment will either obviate the need for home
rule90 or make the state legislature more responsive to urban needs.
Further, only a small fraction of the total population of many, if not
most, states resides in the largest cities. In no state do representatives
from the two most populous cities constitute a majority in either house
of the legislature. Further, although not expressly overruling Baker v.
Catr and subsequent reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court of the
United States, by permitting greater population deviations among leg-
islative districts, appears to have retreated somewhat from its previous
requirement of the most exact proportional representation practicable.9
It is highly unlikely that legislative malapportionment will be as insidi-
ous as in the era prior to Baker v. Carr, but nevertheless a state legislature
in which suburban and rural areas are amply represented seems an un-
certain and unreliable guardian of home rule prerogatives. Skepticism
voiced concerning the wisdom of vesting legislatures with "life or death"
authority over municipal legislation 2 may not be altogether unwarranted.
89. Jerome P. Cavanagh, former Mayor of Detroit, has said, "I could work better with
rural Republican legislators than I could with suburban Democrats. The suburbanites
feel they have escaped the city, and they are not about to share anything with the
cities." Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier has said he finds the suburban attitude to be
one of "Let us tap into your sewage and water systems and your transportation sys-
tems, but keep your damn blacks out of our backyards." David Murray, The Subur-
banite is Described as Today's "Typical" American, The Courier Journal & Times
(Louisville, Ky.), July 19, 1970, § E at 3, col. 1. For comment on the future of the
central city and its suburbs, see M. STEDMAN, URBAN POLITICs 201-04 (2d ed. 1975).
Stedman suggests that in the largest metropolitan areas the suburbs have become in-
creasingly independent of the central city economically and socially as well as politi-
cally.
90. Even assuming perfect proportional representation, home rule remains necessary
and desirable inasmuch as it relieves legislatures of the burden of legislation concerning
local affairs.
91. The Court has upheld reapportionment schemes as constitutional if they are based
on some rational state policy. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cumming, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (re-
districting in accordance with policy of establishing a rough equality of major political
party strength in each district justified representative deviation of 7.83% in the house
districts and 1.81% in the senate districts); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)
(maintenance of existing political boundaries justified representative deviation of 16.4%);
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (preservation of town-county cooperation justi-
fied multimember districting despite total representative deviation of 11.9%); cf. Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
92. See note 85 supra & accompanying text.
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OMISSIONS FROM THE AMA (NLC) MODEL
Direct Grant of Home Rule Authority
The NLC model does not reflect some ideas current in home rule pro-
visions at the time of its publication. For example, it requires charter
adoption as a prerequisite to municipal exercise of home rule powers.
Prior to 1953, New York, Wisconsin, and, to a large extent, Ohio per-
mitted cities to exercise home rule powers without adopting charters,
a concept which has been followed in the recently adopted Kansas,
Wyoming, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Illinois provi-
sions. The home rule idea has been associated historically with the
charter-making power; one early authority endorsed charter writing,
with its attendant examination and review of existing municipal law, as
having a salutary effect upon municipal government.93 Further, before
home rule is adopted, favorable local sentiment arguably should be suf-
ficiently strong to impel the writing of a municipal charter. Occasion-
ally, however, drafting and adopting a municipal charter involves cum-
bersome and difficult procedure similar to that required for drafting
and instituting a new state constitution, and tends to discourage or delay
adoption of home rule. Although experience in some home rule states,
especially the older ones such as Michigan, California, Colorado, and
Oregon, reveals that home rule has not been blocked by charter adoption
requirements, direct constitutional authorization would ease the imple-
mentation of home rule.94
Liberal Judicial Construction of Municipal Powers
Provision is lacking in the NLC model for liberal judicial construction
of -municipal powers, a stipulation which first appeared in the New
Jersey constitution of 19479- and has been included in most recently
93. See H. McBAIN, supra note 1, at 617.
94. See generally Vanlandingham, supra note 1, at 280-81.
95. N.J. CONSr. art. IV, § 7, 11. Although no provision for liberal judicial con-
struction is contained in the text of the NLC model, the New Jersey provision is noted
in the accompanying report. See NILC, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, supra note 5,
at 9. Missouri did not stipulate liberal judicial construction in the NLC-type provision
adopted in 1971. California decisions under a revised local government article that does
not specify liberal interpretation have favored the state. The judicial philosophy has
been "'When there is doubt as to whether an attempted regulation relates to a munici-
pal or to a state matter, or if it be the mixed concern of both, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the legislative authority of the state . . . ." Abbott v. City of
Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960).
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adopted home rule provisions. Because a judicial presumption favoring
the validity of state statutes arises under the separation of powers theory,
cities are placed at a serious disadvantage in the litigation of state-munici-
pal conflicts. Requiring liberal judicial construction of home rule powers
may induce the courts to take a more enlightened attitude toward those
municipal ordinances not entirely consistent with state laws, and it ap-
pears that such a stipulation has reduced the impact of the traditional
pro-state presumption. The Supreme Court of Kansas noted, "This
provision simply means that the home rule power of cities is favored and
should be upheld unless there is a sound reason to deny it." 97 In New
Jersey, the liberal construction provision raises a presumption in favor of
the validity of municipal ordinances,98 and during the first two years of
home rule experience in Illinois, it is believed to have been an influential
factor in several favorable home rule decisions by the supreme court.9
The impact of the liberal construction tenet is nonetheless difficult to
assess given the various possible factual situations involving conflicts be-
tween municipal ordinances and state statutes. Moreover, the rule of
liberal construction cannot grant to cities powers not delegated to
them, 00 and where there is direct conflict between state and municipal
governments in their exercise of powers, the state must always remain
supreme. Finally, the efficacy of the rule rests upon the willingness of
courts to consider and apply it conscientiously.
IMPERIO HOME RULE ANALYZED
Insofar as the imperio model involves a difficult definition of substan-
tive home rule powers, it merits criticism, but in comparison with the
NLC model, the imperio theory offers a more substantial guarantee of
meaningful home rule power. As noted above, particularly in states with
politically weak state municipal leagues and without an effective home
96. But see Moser, County Home Rule-Sharing the State's Legislative Power with
Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REv. 327, 345 n.58 (1968), wherein it is argued that
liberal judicial construction has done little to enlarge local powers.
97. Claflin v. Valsh, 212 Kan. 1, 7, 509 P.2d 1130, 1135 (1973).
98. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Town-
ship of Chester v. Panicucci, 116 N.J. Super. 229, 281 A.2d 811 (1971); State v. Ulesky,
100 N.J. Super. 287, 241 A.2d 671 (1968).
99. Biebel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Uncertain Beginning, 6 JoHN
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 253, 271-72 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Tonsorial, Inc. v. Union City, 115 N.J. Super. 33, 277 A.2d 909 (1971);
Sussex Woodlands, Inc. v. Mayor & Council, 109 N.J. Super. 432, 263 A.2d 502 (1970);
Donovan v. City of New Brunswick, 50 N.J. Super. 102, 141 A.2d 134 (1958).
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rule tradition, provisions based on the NLC model most likely will result
in significant legislative denial of substantive home rule powers.' By
contrast, to the extent that substantive home rule powers are capable of
judicial definition, the imperio model assures cities of at least some im-
portant home rule prerogatives. Of course the dynamic nature of urban
society requires occasional judicial redefinition of governmental powers
and functions. Thus some exclusively municipal affairs are later judicially
declared state in character, a factor deemed a shortcoming of the imperio
theory. This, however, overlooks the fact that redefinition of govern-
mental powers is not unique to imperio states.'2
Although delineation of home rule powers under imperio provisions
admittedly is difficult, it is not an impossible task, and certainly presents
no greater obstacles than does the resolution of numerous other govern-
mental problems, especially those involving conflict of laws.0 3 Further,
while under imperio provisions the judiciary must resolve conflicts be-
tween state and municipal spheres of action, legislative supremacy forces
courts to make equally difficult determinations of whether municipal
powers have been preempted by state legislation.
The imperio experience suggests that its opponents may have exag-
gerated the difficulty of definition: In some states where imperio, home
rule is considered at least moderately successful, notably California, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado, cities for many
years have attempted to exercise home rule powers, and the judiciary
has not hesitated to interpret and define them. Judicial construction has
made California one of the few home rule states wherein home rule
cities enjoy rather broad taxing authority, 0 seemingly essential to the
101. See notes 75-82 supra & accompanying text.
102. By the reasoning of critics of imperio, the general trend of political power from
state to national governments should impair significantly the concept of federalism.
Such an argument could not be persuasively advanced. Cf. Bromage, Home Rule:
Progress or Retrogression, OHIO CITIES & VILLAGES, Dec. 1965, at 6.
103. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire, Maurice H. Merrill, Emeritus Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Oklahoma, Jan. 22, 1971.
104. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. A.E.C. Los Angeles, 33 Cal. App. 3d 933, 109
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973); City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957).
To avoid political opposition, home rule provisions generally exclude taxation from the
powers granted under them. For example, the 1972 Vyoming provision provides that
"[the levying of taxes, excises, fees, or any other charges shall be prescribed by the
legislature." Wyo. Co-sr. art. XIII, § 1(b). The better view is that substantive home
rule with no independent sources of revenue is impotent. Illinois, while making license
fees, occupation taxes, and taxes based on income or earnings subject to legislative
authorization, constitutionally forbids the generai assembly otherwise to deny or limit
the taxing power of home rule units except by a three-fifths majority vote. ILL. CONST.
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successful functioning of home rule. No exhaustive or immutable list
of home rule powers can ever be drawn, but constitutions of a few
states, including New York, California, Illinois, Colorado and Utah,
wisely define some of these prerogatives. Because cities may hesitate to
act under a broad grant of home rule authority such as that provided
by the NLC model, enumeration of some powers within the grant not
only should encourage their use, but also should remove all doubt con-
cerning municipal authority to exercise such powers. 105
The alleged failure of imperio provisions cannot be asserted without
question. It is significant that of the older constitutional home rule states
only Missouri has abandoned an imperio provision and adopted one based
on the NLC model. While a complex urban society with metropolitan
regions containing myriad governmental units may dictate fewer and less
easily defined home rule powers, such powers nevertheless exist and can
be secured effectively given an intelligent and sympathetic judiciary. The
courts have not been altogether unmindful of their role. One of the
principal critics of the NLC model noted that the report itself called
attention to favorable decisions in the imperio state of Ohio.0 6 Another
writer, calling for additional studies to determine the effectiveness and
viability of provisions based on the two major home rule models, noted
the tendency of New York State courts to uphold municipal exercise of
home rule powers absent conflicting legislation under New York's partly
imperio provision.0 7
art. VII, § 6(a), (e), (g). See also Green, Home Rule, Preemption, and the Illinois
General Assembly, in HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS 50-51 (S. Cole & S. Gove eds. 1973)
(background paper prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule held April 5-7,
1973). For additional comment on home rule and municipal taxation, see Vanlanding-
ham, supra note 1, at 271.
105. It has been suggested that Massachusetts should have enumerated some specific
powers appropriate for municipal exercise in its home rule provision. See Zimmerman,
Home Rule in Massachusetts: Some Historical Perspectives, in Home Rule in Action,
Nov. 1970, at 17 (lecture delivered at the Massachusetts Municipal Training Institute at
Boston College, 1970).
106. Bromage, Home Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REV. 132, 135 (1955); NLC,
MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, supra note 5, at 11-12.
107. Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URn. L. 335,
357-58 (1971). Professor Macchiarola suggested that these studies be conducted before
it was "too late." If his alarm stemmed from the specter of states consistently adopting
provisions based on the NLC model, it may be already "too late." Professor Macchiarola
has also observed that the New York judiciary appeared to be a better friend to home
rule than the state legislature. Reply to author's home rule questionnaire, Frank J.
Macchiarola, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, Feb. 18, 1971.
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In some imperio states, such as Oklahoma, 108 Nebraska,10 Arizona,"10
New York,"' and California, 12 judicial interpretation has enabled home
rule cities to enact ordinances on state matters until forbidden by state
law. In these jurisdictions, such cities possess not only judicially defined
municipal powers but also virtually all powers belonging to home rule
cities in states with NLC provisions. Under such circumstances, home
rule authority actually may be broader under the imperio construct than
under NLC provisions. Other imperio states might effect this rule by
constitutional amendment."'
Home Rule and Met'opolitan Area Problems
There are decisions that hold municipal home rule ordinances having
an impact beyond the political boundaries of the city to be non-home
rule in character.' 4 Hence a major criticism of home rule generally, and
imperio home rule in particular, is its alleged impossibility of success for
cities within metropolitan regions. ' , The advocates of imperio home
108. Ex parte Ferguson, 62 Okla. Crim. 145, 70 P.2d 1094 (1937) (finding conflict with
state statute).
109. Consumers' Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922)
(municipal action exceeded limits of delegated power).
110. City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. 1, 6, 164 P.2d 598,
601 (1945).
M11. Conklin v. Wagner, 15 Misc. 2d 978, 981, 182 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683 (1958).
112. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
468 (1969).
113. This procedure would be especially desirable where such a judicial doctrine has
been advocated without success. See, e.g., Kelly v. City of Fort Collins, 163 Colo. 520,
523, 431 P.2d 785, 787 (1967).
114. See notes 47-48 supra & accompanying text.
115. It has been said, "It is one of those curious facts of history that more and more
communities are finally getting home rule at a time when urban problems are less and
less susceptible of solution by one locality. In this situation, home rule can be a barrier
to progress." W. FISHER, S. BROWN & J. GinsoN, GOVERN.xI;ENT IN THE UNITED STATES
404 (1967). See also C. AIcCANDLESS, URnBN GOVERN.I:NT & POLITICS 61 (1970).
Many cities, however, do not have "typical" metropolitan area problems. See Elazar,
Are lVe a Nation of Cities?, in A NATION OF CIIES 94 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968). This
is especially true of the smaller municipalities, unfortunately, despite occasional clamor
of their officials for home rule, cities of this size seldom make wvide use of the power
afforded by it. For instance, during tile first thirty years of Wisconsin constitutional
home rule (the state also has legislative home rule), tile city of Milwaukee accounted
for more than 250 of the 558 charter ordinances adopted by the 550 cities and villages
of the state. Hagensick, Wisconsin Home Rule, 50 NAT. Civic REV. 349 (1961). Also,
during the first six y'ears of Georgia home rule, almost half of the charter amendments
adopted in the state (38 of 77) were adopted by Atlanta. Sentell, "Home Rule": Its
Impact on Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. STATE B.J. 277, 287 (1972).
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rule assert that the inability of these cities to exercise home rule powers
does not stem from any defect in the home rule principle itself, but
rather from an inability or unwillingness to readjust political boundaries.
In many instances, the remedy seems to be annexation of suburban areas
by the central city, or the establishment of metropolitan or regional
governments. Several recently adopted constitutional provisions permit
such governments, 116 and their actual establishment would facilitate great-
er opportunity for exercise of home rule powers.
New Judicial Interpretation of Imperio Provisions Needed
Although imperio provisions have not yielded as much in the way of
home rule as their early advocates hoped or anticipated, in some states,
especially those in which cities have made serious efforts to exercise home
rule powers, experience with them has not been altogether unfruitful.
More than any other factor, narrow and restrictive judicial interpreta-
tion has impeded expansion of home rule powers under inmperio provi-
sions. Advocacy of the imperio model, therefore, must include a cam-
paign for new approaches in its judicial interpretation." 7 Inasmuch as
very few substantive functions performed today by state and municipal
governments are purely state or purely municipal, 18 neither the NLC
nor the inmperio model can prevent the inevitable conflicts of authority
between these entities. Yet in the "gray area" wherein governmental
functions fuse or overlap lies the greatest opportunity for municipal ex-
ercise of home rule powers. This fact apparently was recognized in the
draft New York State constitution, defeated in a 1967 referendum,
116. See, e.g., CONN. CoNIsT. art. X, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10; MONT. CONsT. art.
XI, 5 7; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9. Concerning establishment of such governments since
1949, see Marando, The Politics of City-County Consolidation, 64 NAT. Civic REV. 76
(1975).
117. In a previous article the author was more critical of imperio provisions than he
is presently. Vanlandingham, supra note 1, at 291-93. Perhaps at that time he had
given insufficient thought to the mixed character of governmental functions. Further, at
least some state supreme courts since have displayed a greater tendency not to uphold
state preemption of municipal powers. Lastly, should a state legislature follow a per-
sistent policy of preempting so-called home rule powers, the imperio provision may be
the best corrective.
118. As early as 1899 it was stated, "The relationship existing between a state and its
municipalities is so close that it may be said every city ordinance and every state
statute is a matter of interest to both state and municipality. It may be said that all
state affairs are a matter of substantial interest to the municipality, and that likewise all
municipal affairs are a matter of concern to the state." Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383,
386, 58 P. 923, 924-25 (1899).
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which would have authorized home rule in "local aspects of matters of
state concern." 119
Much of the future success of home rule under both imperio and leg-
islative supremacy provisions rests, as Professor Bromage has suggested,
upon a wiser and broader sweep of judicial interpretation. 2 ' Where
substantive state and municipal functions overlap, the judiciary must fer-
ret out such powers as are appropriate for municipal exercise. Absent a
clear legislative intent to make enactments bearing upon a particular
subject area exclusive, a home rule city should be permitted to enact
ordinances within the same area, unless such municipal ordinances direct-
ly frustrate or impede the accomplishment of a state purpose. 2' This
policy is consistent with the current position of the Supreme Court in
cases involving federal preemption of state powers. 22 Of course, as
noted by Justice Holmes, all preemption decisions must be based upon
the facts in each case.123 To assist the judiciary in deciding home rule
cases, express constitutional or statutory standards might be prescribed.
For example, state preemption of municipal home rule powers should
never be presumed, and there should be a finding of clear and irreconcil-
able conflict before a state statute is allowed to override a home rule
ordinance. 124
119. Draft N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 2(c) (1) (1967), published in the N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 1967, at 25, col. 6.
120. See Bromage, Home Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT. MU N. REv. 132, 136, 158 (1955).
Professor Bromage's observation was directed particularly toward imperio provisions,
but it is equally applicable to NLC provisions, especially insofar as they involve the
problem of state-municipal conflict or state preemption of municipal powers.
121. Preemption should be upheld with caution. If a single enactment containing no
expression or inference of legislative intent as to the scope of its application is held
to preclude all municipal action in a particular area, the effect will be to limit severely
municipal action, and will render any form of home rule worthless. Cf. Moser, supra
note 96, at 351, n.80.
122. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). The standard applied by the Supreme
Court in cases of federal preemption likely would have the effect of enlarging the
scope of municipal home rule powers if applied in that context, as it has been in a few
states. See, e.g., Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470, 475 (Alas. 1969); City of
Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Mid. 303, 317-18, 255 A.2d 376, 382 (Md. Ct. App. 1969); Bloom
v. City of Worcester, 293 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Mass. 1973); Wagstaff v. Groves, 419 S.W.2d
441,443-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
123. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919) (referring
to federal preemption).
124. An Iowa statute provides: "An exercise of a city power is not inconsistent
with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law." IowA CODE ANN.
§ 364.2(3) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975). Coupled with a provision for liberal judicial con-
struction of municipal powers, such a measure should serve to protect home rule
municipalities against unreasonable judicial findings of preemption.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The future success of home rule provisions based on the NLC model
cannot be predicted accurately, for any meaningful evaluation of their
performance depends upon the accumulation of many more years of ex-
perience under the model. The development of legislative supremacy
provisions has exposed two principal difficulties: the judicial reading of
the imperio doctrine or the state-municipal dichotomy into NLC-type
schemes, as the Alaska and New Mexico supreme courts have done al-
ready, and the denial of legitimate home rule prerogatives by "state cen-
tered legislatures" with or without the urging of local special interest
groups. But whether NLC provisions actually are preferable to imperio
provisions presently appears completely irrelevant. Many states, espe-
cially those which have not previously had home rule, have adopted
NLC provisions constitutionally, and will retain them for some time. In
the event legislative supremacy proves unsatisfactory, however, the only
alternative is a return to imperio home rule.
Because they consider state and municipal powers difficult to define
and separate, proponents of the NLC model have deemed imperio an
unworkable concept. Nevertheless imperio remains an active doctrine;
only one of the older imperio states, Missouri, has abandoned an imperio
provision for one based on the NLC model, while several other states
have adopted provisions combining features of both imperio and NLC
models. As previously noted, these latter provisions may result in even
less home rule than could be obtained under provisions based solely on
either model. 125 Having developed a substantial body of case law on
their own provisions and perhaps fearing less satisfactory home rule
under an NLC model, the older inperio home rule states are unlikely to
change doctrines in the near future.
In a complex urban civilization, substantive governmental functions
which can be deemed purely state or purely municipal are rare. The
greatest opportunity for municipal exercise of home rule powers lies in
the gray area wherein such functions mix. The future viability of home
rule under either imperio or NLC provisions therefore depends upon the
willingness and ability of the judiciary to extract from this area such
powers as are appropriate for municipal exercise. Under the NLC model,
and to some extent under imperio provisions, the state legislature can
preempt powers and hence maintain its proper role as the embodiment
of state authority. For this reason, the importance of competent leg-
125. See notes 18-19 supra & accompanying text.
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islators concerned with the welfare of both the state and home rule
municipalities cannot be overemphasized. Further, where the legislature
has acted in a particular area, a home rule ordinance operative within the
same sphere should not be disallowed judicially unless it impedes the ac-
complishment of a state purpose. Some state courts already have em-
braced this tenet; to the extent that other jurisdictions follow, the scope
of home rule powers will be enlarged greatly.
For home rule to succeed under either imperio or NLC-type provi-
sions, cities must recognize that home rule begins at home. They must
become more aggressive in exercising home rule powers, taking the in-
itiative by acting on matters properly within their province without
inviting delay and frustration by first requesting enabling legislation.
Unfortunately, many city councils probably hesitate to act on legitimate
home rule matters because they are uncertain of the extent of their au-
thority. This is especially true under NLC-type provisions, which may
include broad, undefined grants of municipal power. Constitutional or
legislative enumeration of at least some powers would tend to stimulate
local action. A state administrative agency such as a state department
of community affairs, through advice and assistance, could encourage
greater municipal use of home rule powers. Including a constitutional
provision directing liberal construction of home rule powers may ef-
fectually broaden the scope of home rule. At worst it may be ignored,
but in some states where this step has been taken, it has had a promunici-
pal influence on the courts. Since, absent state legislative authorization,
municipalities usually cannot exercise authority beyond their territorial
boundaries, metropolitan integration either through central city annexa-
tion of surrounding suburban areas or through establishment of regional
or metropolitan governments should increase the potential of home rule,
especially in imperio jurisdictions.
Properly understood, home rule certainly is no panacea for all munici-
pal problems, the greatest of which transcend individual city boundaries.
A comment made concerning the Illinois constitution of 1970 noted,
"Unfortunately, nothing written in the new constitution is likely to af-
fect the reality of urban problems-of decay, deprivation, segregation,
crime, sprawl, and pollution. Whatever solutions there may be to these
problems will be found largely outside of legal concepts of state consti-
tutions and judicial interpretations of municipal powers." 120 Home
126. Levin, City Power and the Federal System: Home Rule in Context, in HOME
RULE IN ILuNOIS 115 (S. Cole & S. Gove eds. 1973) (background paper prepared for
the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule held April 5-7, 1973).
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rule is widely desired by cities, nonetheless, and to the extent that cities
adopt and utilize granted powers, they will free the state legislature
to spend more time on state affairs. In an earlier era, home rule fostered
such advances as the council manager plan in municipal government.
Today and in the future, it can make citizens more responsible partici-
pants in the federal system. But successful self-government depends upon
a favorable state legislative and judicial climate and a willingness by the
municipality to exercise powers aggressively. Assuming these conditions,
home rule can flourish under either NLC or imperio provisions.
